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A B S T R A C T
In this contribution we demonstrate that European citizens
distinguish between political and instrumental Euro-scepti-
cism and indicate the extent to which these Euro-sceptic
positions are endorsed. Data from 143,367 European citizens
in 15 countries and 182 regions show that political Euro-
scepticism constitutes a cumulative evaluation in each Euro-
pean country. European citizens who are Euro-sceptic on
international policies are also Euro-sceptic on joint decisions
on immigration policies and sociocultural policies. More-
over, we notice that political Euro-scepticism is modestly
correlated with instrumental Euro-scepticism. We explore
the extent to which both forms of Euro-scepticism vary
between countries and regions and to what extent the
percentages of missing values on these measurements
affect the degree of Euro-scepticism at the national and
regional level. This contribution shows that research on
Euro-scepticism to date is skewed by a focus on instru-
mental Euro-scepticism.
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Introduction
Since the beginning of the process of European unification, there have been
serious arguments on the ways to deal with national versus supranational
governmental responsibilities. In fact, many public disputes revolve around
this matter of responsibility. Time and again this Euro-scepticism has come
to the fore (Scheuer, 1999), also indicated by dissatisfaction with supranational
EU institutions and the (lack of) democratic procedures (Norris, 1999). Yet,
going through the numerous studies on Euro-scepticism, the reader is
confronted with the question: ‘What kind of scepticism towards Europe are
we talking about?’ Indeed, it is the first aim of the present study to differen-
tiate conceptually between dimensions of Euro-scepticism. Therefore, we will
set out to disentangle whether measurements of ‘scepticism’ towards the
European Union (EU) refer to one single or different latent dimensions.
Most previous research has restricted itself to exploring instrumental
Euro-scepticism (Anderson, 1998; Dekker et al., 2002; Eichenberg and
Dalton, 1993; Gabel, 1998; Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Mahler et al., 2000;
Niedermayer, 1995). The question ‘Did your country benefit from member-
ship of the EU?’ has figured prominently in this research; it is clearly linked
to the cost–benefit research tradition or the so-called instrumental approach.
Additionally, other research took the questions concerning approval of the
euro into account or whether it is a good or bad thing to be a member of
the European Union (Anderson, 1998; Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993). Still
others have described and explained to what extent people believe that
policies should be decided at the national level or at the European level,
thereby paying attention to the allocation of national policies to the Union
(Dalton and Eichenberg, 1998; Schmitt and Thomassen, 1999; De Winter and
Swyngedouw, 1999; Gabel and Anderson, 2002). Gabel (1998) investigated
whether support for European integration (measured by membership evalu-
ation) was associated with evaluation of four policy issues to be decided by
the national government or jointly by the EU, i.e. political Euro-scepticism.
He concluded that it was, at least to some extent, so he continued his
research solely on instrumental Euro-scepticism. De Winter and Swynge-
douw (1999) showed to what extent political Euro-scepticism is affected by
instrumental Euro-scepticism.
In this contribution we propose to disentangle the instrumental approach
to public Euro-scepticism from political Euro-scepticism. We focus on Euro-
scepticism among the general European public: public rejection of the EU and
public refusals to provide more legitimate power to supranational institutions
to deal with policy issues. We will establish whether political Euro-scepticism
can be referred to as one dimension. Then we test whether instrumental and
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political Euro-scepticism can be distinguished factorially. Finally, we test and
map to what extent political and instrumental Euro-scepticism vary across
the countries and regions of the Union. We also test to what extent patterns
in missing values mingle in national and regional variation of Euro-
scepticism. Notice that our aim here is first of all to describe these phenomena
before starting to explain the variance of Euro-scepticism with individual or
contextual characteristics.
Decisions in Brussels: Political Euro-scepticism
The European Union has increased its power in policy-making in numerous
fields and has expanded its domain widely (Van de Meerssche, 1990).
Whereas it started as an Economic Community, today the Union’s Parliament
(EP) is concerned with a range of topics as broad as those of parliaments of
national states. The European Constitution is one in which various policy
domains move further from the nations to the Union. Though few countries
have held referenda over which policies should be decided at the European
level, it is easy to imagine that legitimating the European Union in the long
run stands or falls on the extent to which the European population supports
decision-making processes at this supranational level (De Winter and Swyn-
gedouw, 1999). In more and more countries, citizens, political parties and
associations protest against the power that the Union is appropriating. These
critics of further unification point to the present ignorance of the public, while
the process of ‘eurofication’ is still continuing. Others echo that democratiz-
ation processes should be given priority before the Union actively has a larger
say on policy domains. Weber, the founding father of the sociology of bureau-
cratization, indeed would have expected that institutions with power can
exist only with the legitimation of its citizens (Ultee et al., 1996; Weber, 1922).
The hypothesis Weber developed was directed towards the double
monopoly of the state over the use of violence and the right of taxation. It is
only because people provide this monopoly with the meaning of authority
that citizens approve of the existence of the state. Modern democratic states
enforce policies and citizens regard this as legitimate because they themselves
elect the government; this has been labelled democratic coercion (Ultee et al.,
1996). The legitimacy of the European Union can be regarded in the same
way, although election turnouts in many countries are extremely low for the
EP elections. Moreover, the process of European integration was initially
considered to be driven by elite actions, for which Europeans provided
‘permissive consensus’ (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993: 507). Eichenberg and
Dalton show, however, that the importance of public support for further
European integration has increased significantly. The question, then, is to
Lubbers and Scheepers Political versus Instrumental Euro-scepticism 2 2 5
04 Lubbers (to/d)  12/4/05  11:25 am  Page 225
what extent European citizens legitimate decision-making about particular
policy domains by the EU.
One of the straightforward answers to this is that political Euro-scepti-
cism is ordered by the ‘national difficulty’ criterion (Dalton and Eichenberg,
1998). Political problems that are difficult for single nation-states to solve are
more likely to find support for a decision to be made at the supranational
level. The extent to which problems are regarded as international is an inter-
play of ‘attributed, exogenous and endogenous internationalization’ (Sinnott,
1995). Attributed internationalization refers to public opinion and exogenous
internationalization to institutionalized international claims over the
problem, so endogenous internationalization is the most interesting from our
point of view. Here, ‘internationalization arises from the nature of the issue
and exists whether or not it is perceived by the public’ (Sinnott, 1995: 248).
Examples of such policies are environmental issues and fighting crime. In
contrast, policy issues that seem to cross borders to a lesser extent would be
withheld from joint European policy-making – for example, sociocultural
policies on education, health care and culture. De Winter and Swyngedouw
(1999: 51) emphasize however that ‘there is no consensus on the range of
problems that . . . belong to the remit of local, regional, national, European,
or international governance’. De Winter and Swyngedouw (1999: 61) classify
problems (as identified by respondents as the three most important) into four
categories, ranging from ‘genuine national matters’ to ‘problems with genuine
international dimensions’. This classification is close to Hooghe’s distri-
butional logic on government spending. Hooghe (2003: 292) argues that ‘Euro-
peanization is lowest for policies with the highest financial flow from state to
citizen’.
Gabel and Anderson (2002) studied the mapping of the structure of EU
policy preferences and the extent to which models of policy space as described
by Marks and Steenbergen (2002) apply to public opinion. Therefore, the main
focus was respondents’ preference for a more active EU on a number of
policies and not so much the question of whether EU citizens believe that
policies should be decided at the national or at the European level. Nonethe-
less, Gabel and Anderson show that the priorities for these issues are best
described by one dimension, which they refer to as the ‘international relation’
model. Gabel and Anderson expected such a model of preferences to be
dominant if citizens evaluate the various EU policies in terms of giving up
national sovereignty.
Although we expect, like Gabel and Anderson (2002), that, if one is scep-
tical about a larger say for the Union on one issue, the likelihood increases
that one is sceptical about the Union’s interference in any other issue, we
additionally expect a hierarchy of issues. Following Dalton and Eichenberg
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(1998) and De Winter and Swyngedouw (1999), we expect that political Euro-
scepticism is lowest for international issues, because people would profit from
nations cooperating to solve problems, and it is highest for sociocultural
policy issues. Moreover, we expect a cumulative structure to political Euro-
scepticism. So, if people are Euro-sceptic on international policies, we also
expect them to be Euro-sceptic on joint European decision-making in the
sociocultural domain.
Instrumental Euro-scepticism
Previous research has focused mainly on instrumental Euro-scepticism,
meaning that people are sceptical about the benefits of the EU for their
particular country. Often, this scepticism was interpreted in terms of the
actual financial costs and benefits that countries, regions and social categories
could expect from the Union’s redistribution policies (Eichenberg and Dalton,
1993; Gabel, 1998). We expect such instrumental Euro-scepticism to be associ-
ated with political Euro-scepticism. Moreover, we expect that the two dimen-
sions of Euro-scepticism can be empirically distinguished. The crucial
argument for this hypothesis is that Europeans distinguish between, on the
one hand, the financial costs and benefits from the European Union and, on
the other hand, the extent of the EU’s political power in several policy
domains. We set out to find evidence for this in each of the countries of the
Union and to investigate whether these dimensions are positively associated
in each EU region. Because countries as well as regions vary in their budgetary
returns from the EU, we take into account both levels. Moreover, regions vary
in their relation to the nation-state, which may be of importance for the vari-
ation in Euro-scepticism across regions.
Data and measurements
The Eurobarometer surveys provide us with the necessary measurements. Since
these studies are conducted repeatedly, they provide a large data set, making
estimations of regional variation possible too.1 We used the Mannheim Euro-
barometer Trend File and selected the Eurobarometers from 1995 to 1999 (42.0,
43.1, 46.0, 47.1, 48.0, 49.0, 50.0 and 51.0; Schmitt, 2001). To these we added
Eurobarometer 53.0, which was collected in 2000 (Hartung, 2000). The data
cover only the old member states of the EU and include 143,367 respondents.
For data documentation we refer to the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File
codebook (Scholz and Schmitt, 2001).2
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Measurements of Euro-scepticism
With respect to political Euro-scepticism, 13 policy areas were measured in
the pooled Eurobarometers: currency; defence; scientific and technological
research; foreign policy towards countries outside the European Union; fight
against drugs; protection of the environment; immigration; asylum seekers;
education; health and social welfare; fighting unemployment; basic rules for
broadcasting and the press; and cultural policy. Respondents were presented
the introduction that ‘Some people believe that certain areas of policy should
be decided by the (national) government, while other areas of policy should
be decided jointly within the European Union’. Thereafter, respondents were
asked to judge whether the policies mentioned should be decided by the
national government or jointly within the European Union.
The description of the policy items by country (Appendix 13) and the
extent to which people prefer their own national government to decide shows
that respondents are least Euro-sceptic on the issues of ‘science’ (27.3),
‘fighting drugs’ (28.1) and ‘foreign policy towards countries outside the EU’
(28.4). Respondents are particularly Euro-sceptic regarding the policy issues
of ‘culture’ (65.4%), ‘education’ (67.1%) and ‘health and welfare’ (67.7%),
which are all typical sociocultural policies. The variation between countries
is large though. Italians are most in favour of joint decision-making within
the EU in almost all policy areas. The only areas in which they are outplaced
are ‘defence’ and ‘environment’ (the Netherlands) and ‘science’ (Luxem-
bourg). The strongest opposition to joint decision-making is found in Finland
(‘defence’, ‘environment’, ‘immigration’, ‘asylum seekers’ and ‘health and
welfare’), Denmark (‘fighting unemployment’, ‘culture’ and ‘press stan-
dards’), Northern Ireland (‘drugs’, ‘science’ and ‘education’), Great Britain
(‘currency’) and Sweden (‘foreign policy towards countries outside the EU’).
Two other items of – instrumental – Euro-scepticism are widely reported
in previous research. First, we used the question ‘Generally speaking, do you
think that (our country’s) membership of the European Union is (1) a good
thing (2) a bad thing (3) neither good nor bad?’.4 Second, we took into account
whether respondents perceive that their country has benefited from member-
ship. Respondents who did not give an answer to either question or provided
a ‘don’t know’ answer were given a missing value.
Missing values
The two questions most widely used in comparative research on Euro-
scepticism differ strongly in the difficulty respondents experience in answer-
ing them. Whereas the question on EU membership evaluation was often
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answered (only 7.3% missing), the question of whether or not the country has
benefited from being an EU member was often not answered (19.1%).
Moreover, respondents found it hard to answer questions referring to the
policy areas of ‘asylum seekers’, ‘culture’ and ‘press standards’.
Northern Ireland, Portugal and Spain have systematically more missing
values than the average for all items, whereas Denmark, Finland and the
Netherlands have systematically fewer missing values. The difference in
missing values is particularly large between Ireland (9.2%) and Northern
Ireland (27.5%) on the question of whether or not the country has benefited
from EU membership. Regarding the various policy areas, the largest propor-
tion of missing values was in Portugal concerning asylum seekers (18.1%),
whereas the fewest missing values were in the Netherlands in relation to the
decision on fighting drugs (6.5%). After analysing the clustering of the items,
we will pay attention to dealing with missing values.
Dimensions of Euro-scepticism
The main question is whether all the measurements of political Euro-scepti-
cism actually refer to one single dimension. The descriptive analyses point to
some correspondence between domains for which people are opposed to
European policy intervention, which seem to range from international issues
to specific national sociocultural affairs. This idea of a cumulative structure
of political Euro-scepticism can be tested with Mokken analyses. Such
analyses provide the details that allow us to see whether items referring to
political Euro-scepticism have a cumulative dimension. From this we can
draw the conclusion that, if one is sceptical about European policy-making
in one domain, one is probably sceptical about European policy-making in
other domains as well. Taking into account similarities in the distributions of
the policy items (popularities), we can group the policies into three different
domains. One contains international policies (‘fighting drugs’, ‘protection of
the environment’, ‘scientific and technological research’ and ‘foreign policy
towards countries outside the EU’). A second contains sociocultural policies
(‘education’, ‘health and welfare’, ‘basic rules for broadcasting and the press’
and ‘culture’). The distributions of ‘immigration’ and ‘asylum’ policies fall
between the popularities of these two domains, so we will consider them to
constitute a separate domain.5
In Appendix 2, the three issue domains are presented with the popu-
larities, together with other relevant statistics for each country (H – for scal-
ability – and Rho – for reliability – provided by the Mokken analyses;
Molenaar and Sijtsma, 2000). The results are quite satisfactory. The order of
the popularities is similar in all of the countries. Furthermore, the analyses
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provide strong and highly consistent scales in most countries, with only few
exceptions. That is, in most countries the H parameters of scalability are well
over .40, indicating intermediate to strong scales, whereas the parameters for
Rho indicate reliable scales. Only for Finland do the statistics suggest a weak
scale (H = .36). We can conclude that, if European citizens are Euro-sceptic
on international issues, they also are Euro-sceptic on immigration and asylum
policies, as well as on policies in the sociocultural domain. Such cumulative
political Euro-scepticism holds for each country.
The next question to be answered is whether the measurement of political
Euro-scepticism is empirically distinct from the traditional measurements of
instrumental Euro-scepticism.6 Confirmatory factor analyses with oblique
rotation on the two instrumental measurements and the newly constructed
measurements of political Euro-scepticism provide clear results. The two
instrumental items form one dimension of instrumental Euro-scepticism with
high factor loadings, whereas the subscales referring to Euro-scepticism about
joint decision-making come out as a separate factor of political Euro-
scepticism with high factor loadings too (see Table 1).7 The cross-loadings are
negligible. In Appendix 3, the solution is reported per country. These results
show high comparability between the countries.
Reliability analyses show that the internal consistency of the instrumental
Euro-scepticism scale becomes satisfactory when political Euro-scepticism is
left out (Cronbach’s alpha increases from .41 to .69). Viewing all of this
European Union Politics 6(2)2 3 0
Table 1 Confirmatory factor solution of instrumental and political Euro-scepticism:
Principal axis factoring, oblique rotation (missing listwise)
Factor 1 Factor 2
Instrumental Political 
h2 Euro-scepticism Euro-scepticism
National government should decide 
about international policies .32 .04 .55
National government should decide 
about immigration polices .40 .01 .63
National government should decide 
about sociocultural policies .30 –.04 .55
European Union membership 
evaluation .52 .72 –.01
Country benefits from membership 
of the EU .53 .73 .01
Source: Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File and Eurobarometer 53.0; N = 108,981.
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empirical evidence together leads us to conclude that two distinct dimensions
of Euro-scepticism exist.
Treatment of missing values
Listwise deletion of missing values leads to large losses of information. There-
fore, when constructing the scales as the means of the items, the criterion was
that at least half the items that related to a scale needed to be answered by a
respondent before a score could be calculated on the scale. For example, the
subscale referring to Euro-scepticism on international policies consists of four
items. If respondents answered only two of the items, the means of these two
items were calculated rather than of all four items. If respondents had three
missing answers, they were assigned a missing value on the scale. This
procedure reduced the number of missing values to acceptable levels (below
5%). Nevertheless, the percentages remained higher for Northern Ireland,
Portugal and Spain. The fact that in these countries a larger proportion of
respondents dropped from the analyses could imply that this in itself may
explain variation between countries in Euro-scepticism (and likewise between
regions). We therefore constructed two aggregate measures of missing values
on the scales and included these in the variance analyses.
The percentages of missing values on political Euro-scepticism range
from 1.4% in the Netherlands to 11.4% in Portugal. Missing values on instru-
mental Euro-scepticism range from 1.6% in Denmark to 12.7% in Northern
Ireland. At the regional level, missing values on political Euro-scepticism vary
from 0.6% in Dutch Flevoland (n = 164) to 19.1% in Portuguese Madeira (n
= 220). Missing values on instrumental Euro-scepticism range from 0.4% in
the French Alsace (n = 232) to 13.6% in Greater Manchester (n = 447).
Although it holds that the majority of respondents do have an opinion on
these topics, as emphasized by De Winter and Swyngedouw (1999: 53), vari-
ation between countries and regions is quite large. We also constructed
measurements in which the missing data were imputed, using regression
analysis and the EM procedure (King et al., 2001).
Regional and national variation in Euro-scepticism
Previous research has provided empirical and theoretical explanations of why
and to what extent countries and regions would vary in their support for
European integration. Most of them are categorized into ‘economic’ or
‘political’ explanations (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993). For our two dimen-
sions, we compare the extent of the variation between countries and regions.
We first describe the extent to which countries differ. Figure 1 shows the
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cumulative political Euro-scepticism dimension for each country. It demon-
strates that Euro-scepticism in all three domains is lowest in the Netherlands
(NL – 17%) whereas half of the Swedes (SE) and Finns (FI) are Euro-sceptic in
all policy domains. Moreover, 82% of Finns are Euro-sceptic on immigration
policies and on sociocultural policies, whereas this two-domain scepticism is
lowest in Italy (IT – 30%). Finally, Euro-scepticism in the sociopolitical domain
is highest in Denmark (DK – 91%) and lowest in Italy (56%).
Figure 2 shows that instrumental Euro-scepticism is most widespread in
Sweden (SE), Austria (AT) and Great Britain (GB). It is particularly low
in Ireland (IE), followed by Luxembourg (LU), the Netherlands (NL) and
Italy (IT).
Mapping Euro-scepticism: Differences across Europe
To compare the pattern of both dimensions of Euro-scepticism across Europe,
maps are presented that show mean support within European regions.
Comparing both maps makes visible to what extent differences exist across
the Union in political and instrumental Euro-scepticism.
Political Euro-scepticism is particularly low in Italy, on Crete, in the
Flemish province of Antwerp and in the provinces of Flemish and Dutch
Limburg. Remarkably, the region of Strasbourg (Alsace) scores at the low end
European Union Politics 6(2)2 3 2
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Figure 1 Political Euro-scepticism about policy domains by country (average
1995–2000).
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too, whereas political Euro-scepticism in Brussels is at the European average.
Political Euro-scepticism is widespread in the whole of Denmark, Sweden,
Finland and Great Britain. Various regions in Spain, Portugal, France, Austria,
Ireland and Greece score high too.
This contrasts with the pattern of instrumental scepticism, which is
almost absent in Ireland and Greece, as well as in Italy and the Netherlands.
Instrumental Euro-scepticism is strong in Finland, Great Britain and Sweden,
and is also more widespread in eastern Austria, central France, central
Belgium and central and eastern Germany.
After computing the differences between the two dimensions of Euro-
scepticism,8 it turns out that political Euro-scepticism is more widespread
than instrumental Euro-scepticism. What is interesting is the variation
between the European regions. In 20 regions, political Euro-scepticism is
equally or less widespread than instrumental Euro-scepticism. This holds for
some of the German and French regions as well as for the Italian regions of
Piemonte and Liguria. On the other hand, political Euro-scepticism is much
stronger than instrumental Euro-scepticism in Finland, Ireland, the Nether-
lands, Luxembourg, Greece, Portugal, southern Italy and some British and
Swedish regions.
Correlations between Euro-sceptic dimensions
Political Euro-scepticism is modestly correlated to instrumental Euro-scepti-
cism (.21). When we test the comparability of the correlations across coun-
tries, we find that the positive significant relation ranges from .12 in Ireland
to .31 in Denmark (Table 2). Thus, the extent to which political Euro-scepti-
cism goes hand in hand with instrumental Euro-scepticism is greatest in
Denmark, followed by Great Britain (.29) and Sweden (.25). After Ireland, this
Lubbers and Scheepers Political versus Instrumental Euro-scepticism 2 3 3
Figure 2 Instrumental Euro-scepticism by country (average 1995–2000).
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Map 1 Political Euro-scepticism across European regions (average 1995–2000).
Map 2 Instrumental Euro-scepticism across regions (average 1995–2000).
Means
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relation is particularly small in Luxembourg (.13), Italy (.13), the Netherlands
(.14) and Greece (.15).
However, regional variation within countries regarding this relation is
large (Table 2). In a few Italian regions, in Dutch Flevoland and on
Portuguese Madeira the relation is even negative. Given that the number of
respondents in each region exceeds 150, this does not seem to be a problem
of too few cases. But, as both Flevoland and Madeira were also mentioned
in the section on missing values, the question comes to the fore about the
extent to which the correlations are dependent on the percentages of missing
values in a region. Additional aggregated regional-level analysis shows –
surprisingly – that the strength of the correlation between political and
instrumental Euro-scepticism is associated differently with the percentages
of missing values in political Euro-scepticism compared with instrumental
Euro-scepticism. Although we should not place too much emphasis on the
findings, because the correlations are (just) not significant at the p < .05
level, the parameters point to a positive association between the percent-
ages of missing values on the instrumental dimension of Euro-scepticism
and the strength of the correlation between the two forms of Euro-
scepticism. In contrast, we found a negative association between the
percentages of missing values on the political Euro-scepticism scale and the
strength of the correlation.
Levels of variance
Our next question is whether there are significant differences in the regional
and national contexts on both dimensions of Euro-scepticism. Table 3 presents
basic multi-level models for political and instrumental Euro-scepticism,
respectively.9 Multi-level analyses estimate the variance according to a nesting
principle, and hence account for within- and between-level variation (e.g.
Snijders and Bosker, 1999). In these models we consequently add the country
and region level to find out (1) to what extent the fit of the model improves
by including the different contexts, (2) to what extent a context is of relevance
and (3) whether there are differences between the variances of the two Euro-
sceptic attitudes we have distinguished. All models are controlled for vari-
ation over time.
The results show that Euro-sceptic attitudes vary across individuals, over
time and across nations as well as across regions. The importance of the
regional level is smallest, but including regional differences improves the
model fit significantly (compare model III with model II in Table 3). Regional
variation in both Euro-sceptic attitudes contributes around 1% to the variance.
The country level accounts for a larger share of variation: 8.2% for political
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Table 2 Correlations between political Euro-scepticism and instrumental Euro-scepticism
Political 
Correlations Euro-scepticism*
between Instrumental Region within country  Region within country  
factors Euro-scepticism with lowest correlation n with highest correlation n
Austria .23* Niederösterreich .18* 1421 Vorarlberg .33* 320
Flanders .16* West-Vlaanderen .05 1081 Vlaams Brabant .42* 680
Wallonia .19* Liège .08* 833 Bruxelles .29* 1014
Denmark .31* Bornholm et al. .26* 1043 Copenhagen .32* 2896
Finland .19* Itä-Suomi .13* 1285 Uusimaa (Helsinki) .22* 2159
France .23* Bourgogne .05 238 Rhône-Alpes .37* 839
Germany .21* Kassel –.02 152 Süd-Württemberg .44* 169
GB .29* East Midlands .17* 635 Lancashire .38* 232
Greece .15* Thraki .04 299 Thessalia .18* 609
Ireland .12* North West .01 178 Donegal .27* 327
Italy .13* Liguria –.22* 282 Trentino-Alto Adige .29* 140
Luxembourg .13* Luxembourg district .09* 1917 Luxembourg Stadt .16* 1654
Netherlands .14* Flevoland –.03 161 Drenthe .26* 315
N-Ireland .19* – –
Portugal .19* Madeira –.09 178 Açores .35* 186
Spain .19* Navarra and Rioja .06 149 Murcia .40* 194
Sweden .25* Norrland .20* 923 Götaland .26* 1123
Source: Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File and Eurobarometer 53.0.
* p < .01.
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Table 3 Basic multi-level models, presenting variation in political and instrumental Euro-scepticism across countries, regions, years and
individuals
Political Euro-scepticism Instrumental Euro-scepticism
—————————————————————————————— ——————————————————————————————–
Model Ia Model IIa Model IIIa Model IVa Model Ib Model IIb Model IIIb Model IVb 
Individual- + Country- + Region- + Missing Individual- + Country- + Region- + Missing
and year-level level level value and year-level level level value 
variation variation variation variables variation variation variation variables
Intercept 1.655 1.657 1.661 1.668 0.3671 0.3579 0.3593 0.3573
% Missing values at –.020 .0041
national level (.028) (.0122)
% Missing values at –.007 .0047
regional level (.004) (.0019)
 Variances
Ωf – country .087 .090 .085 .0149 .0158 .0153
(.031) (.032) (.030) (.0053) (.0056) (.0054)
Ωv – region .007 .007 .0018 .0017
(.002) (.002) (.0003) (.0003)
Ωu – year .014 .023 .042 .042 .0010 .0035 .0053 .0053
(.007) (.003) (.002) (.002) (.0006) (.0005) (.0003) (.0003)
Ωe – individual 1.077 .983 .960 .960 .1698 .1514 .1482 .1482
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.0006) (.0006) (.0006) (.0006)
–2log likelihood 396,238 384,166 382,668 382,665 145,521 130,199 128,873 128,867
improvement 12,072 1498 3 15,322 1326 6
Source: Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File and Eurobarometer 53.0.
N = 136,050 in models a; N = 136,636 in models b. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Euro-scepticism and 9.2% for instrumental Euro-scepticism. Even though the
Euro-sceptic dimensions are only modestly correlated, the breakdown of the
variation between individuals, regions and countries shows similarities.
Because we found that countries and regions vary quite strongly in the
percentages of missing values that are reported, we included the aggregated
measurements of missing values percentages to find out whether these have
significant effects and explain part of the variance between countries or
regions (model IV in Table 3). With respect to political Euro-scepticism we
can be brief: the percentages of missing values at both the national and the
regional level do not reach significance. Both parameters are, however,
negative, implying that, in countries or regions where more missing values
are reported, the level of political Euro-scepticism is lower. The opposite
relation appears when we take instrumental Euro-scepticism into account,
and this time the parameter of the missing values percentages at the regional
level is significant. This means that the level of instrumental Euro-scepticism
is significantly higher in regions where more missing values are reported.10
Conclusion and discussion
In this article, we have looked at the existence of political Euro-scepticism
alongside the previously much-studied instrumental dimension of Euro-
scepticism. We found evidence that political Euro-scepticism is a cumulative
evaluation of national versus supranational governance in policy domains.
Most European citizens are Euro-sceptic on joint decisions on sociocultural
policies. More than half of European citizens are also Euro-sceptic on immi-
gration and asylum policies, and approximately one-third are Euro-sceptic on
international policies as well. Factor analyses provided evidence that, in all
the ‘old member states’ of the Union, political and instrumental Euro-scepti-
cism can be distinguished and that in all countries the dimensions are posi-
tively but modestly correlated.
Future research on political and instrumental Euro-scepticism should
consider the finding that both the national and the regional contexts are of
importance, although the national context accounts for a larger share of the
variation in Euro-scepticism than does the regional context. Mapping
political and instrumental Euro-scepticism revealed the different geograph-
ical locations of the dimensions. Political Euro-scepticism in the late 1990s
and 2000 is low in Italy, whereas instrumental Euro-scepticism is particularly
low in Ireland. At the other extreme, political as well as instrumental Euro-
scepticism are strong in Finland, Great Britain and Sweden. Political
Euro-scepticism is furthermore strong in Denmark, and instrumental
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Euro-scepticism is widespread in eastern Austria, central France and
central–eastern Germany.
The findings suggest that, in addition to empirical attention to instru-
mental scepticism, more research is needed to explain political Euro-scepti-
cism and the differences between the two. The legitimacy of the Union may
even be more strongly dependent on the reduction of political Euro-
scepticism than of instrumental Euro-scepticism. Moreover, it turned out that
greater attention needs to be paid to patterns in missing values and that indi-
cators should be taken into account to control for variance in missing values
across regions and countries because they could confound the effects of
contextual characteristics.
Notes
We would like to thank the anonymous referees as well as Gerald Schneider for
their suggestions for improving our contribution. Moreover, we thank the critics
present at the ‘Open Minds Conference’ in Lodz, Poland, in September 2003. The
Eurobarometer data are made available by the German Central Archive. The
original collectors of the data and the codebook producers (ICPSR, ZA, SSD) bear
no responsibility for our interpretation of the data.
1 We refer to the ‘country level’ consisting of 13 countries, as well as the
geographical units of Great Britain, Northern Ireland, the Walloon region and
Flanders. We decided to divide the United Kingdom into Great Britain and
Northern Ireland at the higher level of analysis, as in both parts separate
survey samples were drawn. For Belgium, we divided the French speaking
Walloon region (including Brussels) from Dutch speaking Flanders as the
questionnaires differed by language. The regional level is defined such as
used in the Eurobarometer surveys and follows the NUTS2 division. For
Great Britain, NUTS2 units are only used when enough cases were present
at this level, else they were combined into NUTS1 units. Similarly, for
Germany and Greece some of the NUTS2 regions were combined. For the
Republic of Ireland (to which we refer as Ireland), the NUTS3 division was
used. Northern Ireland is not broken down into other lower level regions.
For Luxembourg and Denmark, the Eurobarometer follows its own division
into four regions for both countries, as a NUTS2 division does not exist. The
lowest number of respondents is 145 in the German region of Wiesbaden and
Giesen in Hessen; the highest number is 4404 in Jyllan (Denmark).
2 We have to note, however, that data documentation concerning response rates
and sampling procedures is lacking. Information from some of the separate
data collections shows large variation in response rates between countries; in
some countries, the rate is very low. For these reasons we have compared the
results of our analyses with the provided weights (controlling for sex, age
and geographical distribution within countries). The weighting did not
change the results though. However, these weights do not include the more
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important factor of skewed distributions in education. To account for this, we
estimated an educational weight, based on statistics provided by Eurostat
(2002) and OECD data (1995, 2002). According to these figures, it appears that
the higher educated are overrepresented in most countries, particularly in
Denmark, Finland, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden. There
is, however, a problem comparing the Eurobarometer data with official statis-
tics from the OESO and Eurostat. These offices present the typical ages of
graduation. Of course, these do not match the categorization of education in
years provided by Eurobarometer and, moreover, are different for various
cohorts as educational systems change over time. We therefore compared the
official statistics with the available data on education in years, where we
followed a country-specific formation structure. Including education in the
weights therefore introduced a factor of uncertainty in itself. However, the
results of this weight did not deviate from the unweighted results. We there-
fore present the unweighted results only.
3 The Appendices can be found on the EUP homepage.
4 The item has been recoded such that the score 0 refers to ‘membership is
good’ and the score 1 to ‘membership is bad’. People who answered ‘neither
good nor bad’ were given the value 0.5.
5 Two items are left out of the analyses. The first is ‘defence’, on which Euro-
scepticism differs so strongly between the countries that it does not fit into a
cumulative dimension. The second is ‘currency’, because its significance
varies across countries owing to variation in the introduction of the euro. In
addition, ‘fighting unemployment’ is left out of further analyses, because this
item intersects the items on immigration and asylum when it is taken into
account in the sociocultural domain.
6 The hierarchical scale we derived from the Mokken analysis already implies
that the three policy domains are related. As we showed, scepticism towards
EU policies in international affairs goes hand in hand with scepticism about
EU policy-making on the other domains. Hence, the domains are hierarchi-
cally related. The measurements of the policy sub-domains were constructed
as means of the items. In the measurements of Euro-scepticism on inter-
national issues and cultural issues, two missing values out of four items were
allowed; in the measurements of Euro-scepticism on immigration issues one
missing value out of two items was allowed.
7 Analyses with the Mokken scale instead of the policy domains items also
provided two factors.
8 Computed as the differences between the two scales after transformation to
similar scale ranges from 0 to 1.
9 Results with the measurements where the missing data were imputed
scarcely differed from the presented data. Interested readers can request the
tables from the authors.
10 According to King et al. (2001), people who answer ‘don’t know’ should be
treated as a unit of analysis, instead of imputing a missing score or deleting
them listwise. Additional analyses show that the likelihood of having a
missing value also varies significantly over the levels distinguished.
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